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THE RIGHT OF A WIFE TO SUE HER HUSBAND
FOR A TORT COMMITTED AGAINST HER
PERSON DURING COVERTURE
Probably with respect to no other subject has the law undergone
a greater change in the last century than it has with reference to the
status of a married woman-her ability to hold property, to contract,
to sue and be sued, to be recognized as an entity separate and distinct
from that of her husband. Whereas, in the eighteenth century her
rights as an individual were less than those of a lunatic (as he could
hold separate property, while she could not), today her property rights
are as great as those of her husband, she may contract as freely as a
feme sole, and her other rights are being constantly extended.
Before taking up in detail the subject of this article, it might be
well to take a general view of the history and development of that
branch of the law of which this subject forms a part.
Under the common law, the entity of the wife was regarded as
absolutely merged in that of the husband. They were, in contempla-
tion of the law, but one legal unity. Her property at the time of the
marriage became his; she could contract only with his consent; she
could sue or be sued only by having him joined with her as party plain-
tiff or defendant, and obviously, for this reason, no action was sus-
tainable between them. 1
The first step toward the emancipation of the wife from these
disabilities came with the recognition in equity of these estates which
had been settled to her sole and separate use.2 Courts of Equity
allowed a married woman to maintain a suit in her own name, and
she could husband in a Court of Chancery. This practice was in keep-
ing with the policy of the chancery courts in granting a remedy where-
ever there was none at law.
Following this came the so-called "married women's acts," giv-
ing to the wife the same rights of property and contract that her hus-
band had 4, and today the courts of several states seem to have gone
so far as to advocate that the marital entity be disregarded for any
and all purposes.
I Bank of America v Banks, 101 U. S. 240.
2 Elliot v. Waring, 17 Amer. Dec. 69; Tounes v. Durbin, 3 Metcalfe 352; 77
Am. Dec. 176.
3 Warner v. Warner, 1 Dick. 90; Lombard v. Morse, 155 Mass. 136.
4 Cook v. Cook, 125 Ala. 583; Reed v. Painter, 145 Mo. 341; Smith v. Smith,
20 R I. 556; Montgomery v. Montgomery, 142 Mo. App. 481.
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This article deals with the development and present state of the
law respecting the right of the wife to sue her husband for damages
for a tort committed by him against her person during coverture.
It follows from what was said above, that, at common law, no
such action was sustainable. Not only the legal conception of the
marital relation stood in the way of such a suit, but the very mode of
procedure of the courts precluded such an action, as the wife had
necessarily to join her husband as party with her, and, in fact, he was
considered as the real party plaintiff. Obviously, with the same per-
son both plaintiff and defendant, the action would not lie. So, for
any changes in this doctrine, we must look to the "enabling statutes"
mentioned above. Evidently, to ascertain the rule in any given state,
the logical course would be to examine the statutes and the decisions
of that state. However, these statutes are in general so similar that
it is possible to treat them and the decisions rendered under them as
though they were in fact identical. All the statutes are explicit as
to the property and contract rights conferred, but none that I have
seen have made any express provision for suits between husband and
wife for purely personal torts, and in construing the effect of the
statutes as to these actions, courts have arrived at various conclusions.
All through the nineteenth century and up until the year 1914,
the courts uniformly held that these acts intended to give merely the
rights expressly set forth, and never meant so far to recognize the
separate entity of the wife as to allow her to sue her husband for a
personal tort.
Quite a number of strong and well reasoned decisions lay down
this rule. New York was, perhaps, one of the first states to pass one
of the statutes in question.5 In 1863, a case came up before the
Supreme Court of that state, in which a woman was suing her hus-
band for an assault, and it was held that the statute simply gave to
the wife certain property rights and did not confer upon her a right
of action against her husband for an assault,6 nor for slander.7 In
1882 the same court, acting on the theory that this rule had outgrown
its usefulness, allowed a wife to recover for an assault by her hus-
band,8 but this decision was promptly reversed by the Court of Ap-
5Laws of 1862 (N. Y.) Chapter 172. (This was practically the same as the
earlier statute passed in 1847).6 Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366.
7Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641.
3 Schulz v. Schulz, 27 Hun. 26.
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peals.9 Only one case involving the point has since arisen in New
York, that of Abbe v. Abbe,10 decided by the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court in 1897, in which the decision of the Court of Appeals
in Schulz v. Schulz, supra, was followed.
The United States Supreme Court has adhered to the same rule.
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia held, in the case of
Thompson v. Thompson," that a statute permitting married women
to sue separately "for torts committed against them, as fully and
freely as if they were unmarried," 12 would not permit a married
woman to sue her husband for an assault during coverture, as such
litigation would be "vicious in principle and contrary to sound public
policy." An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the United
States, and, two years later, the decision was affirmed. 13 Judge Day
said in his opinion, "An examination of this class of legislation will
show that it has gone much further in the direction of giving rights
to the wife in the management and control of her separate property
than it has in giving rights of action directly against the husband. In
no act called to our attention has the right of the wife been carried
to the extent of opening the courts to complaints of the character of
the one here involved." However, in this case there was a strong dis-
senting opinion written by Justice Harlan, concurred in by Justices
Hughes and Holmes.
Section 5530 of the Statutes of Minnesota, provided that "women
shall retain the same legal personality after marriage as before mar-
riage, and for any injury sustained to her reputation, person, property
or character, or any natural right, she shall have the same right to
appeal, in her own name alone, for redress and protection, that her
husband has to appeal in his name alone." The Supreme Court of
that state, in the oft-cited case of Strom v. Strom, 4 refused to allow
recovery to a woman against her husband for a personal tort, holding
that the purpose of the statute was merely to place husband and wife
on an equality as to actions by either for injuries, and did not
authorize either to bring an action against the other. A point was
made by counsel for the plaintiff that the right to sue for a tort being
a property right, it fell within the express terms of the statute. The
' Schulz v. Schulz, 89 N. Y. 644.
"022 App. Div. 483.
1131 App. D. C., 557 (1908).
12 D C. Code Sec. 1155.
13 Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611; 30 L. RL A. (N. S.) 1153 (1910).
1498 Minn. 427; 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 191 (1906).
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court held, however, that, since at common law she had no such right
against her husband, and since the statute had not expressly given
her such a right, there was no property right to protect. The same
rule was adopted in Michigan in the case of Ban held v. Banfield,1'
and in New Jersey in the case of Drum v. Drum.'s
In Missouri, in two recent well-reasoned decisions, the law seems
to be definitely settled that no action can be brought by a wife for a
tort against her person by the husband. Tihe case of Rogers v.
Rogers,27 decided in 1915, was an action for false imprisonment in
having the plaintiff committed to and confined in an insane asylum.
Judge Walker, in a strong opinion, held that the statute guaranteeing
to married women certain rights 18 meant to give her only such con-
tract and separate property rights as her husband had, and neither
one had a right to sue the other for a personal tort. The decision in
this case was followed without question by Judge Ellison of the Kan-
sas City Court of Appeals in the very recent case of Butterfield v1.
Butterfield,19 decided in July, 1916.
In Maine, in the case of Abbot v. Abbot,20 a wife, after being
divorced from her husband, sued him for assault and false imprison-
ment in having her committed to an insane asylum during coverture.
The contention of the plaintiff was that the inability to sue her hus-
band during coverture was due to the fact that the right of action
was suspended during this period, rather than because no such right
arose. The court denied the right of the wife to recover. It held
that no action had ever arisen, and that divorce could not make that
a cause of action which was not a cause of action before. This deci-
sion was later followed in the case of Libbey v. Berry," the judge
stating in his opinion that the statute 22 did not enable her "to main-
tain suits which could not have been brought in his name, either alone
or as party plaintiff with her." An Illinois case in which the facts
were similar to those in Abbot v. Abbot was decided in the same way
and upon the same grounds,23 and in Iowa, it was early decided, that
1117 Mich. 80; 40 L. R. A. 757 (1898).
1s 69 N. J. L..557.
17 265 Mo. 200.Is R. S. of Mo. 1909, Sec. 8304.
19187 S. W. 295.
20 67 Me. 304 (1877).
2174 Me. 286 (1883).
22 Stat. of Mo. 1876, c. 112.
2 Maine v. Maine, 46 I1. App. 106, (1891).
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though radical changes in the relation of husband and wife had been
made by the statute, still these changes did not reach the extent of
allowing the wife to sue the husband for an assault during coverture.24
In the case of Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe,2 decided in Tennessee
in 1915, it was held that, since the married woman's act was in abroga-
gation of the common law, it must be strictly construed, and only such
changes recognized as were expressly laid down. The court said, in
part, "We must assume that the legislature had in mind the passage
of the act, the fundamental doctrine of the unity of husband and wife
under the common law, and to the correlative duties of husband and
wife to each other, and to the well-being of the social order growing
out of the marriage relation, and that, if it had been the purpose of
the legislature to alter these further than as indicated in the act, that
purpose would have appeared by necessary implication."
In Washington, in the case of Schulz v. Christopher, a wife
sued her husband for an assault. It was held that a statute which
provided that "the wife shall have the same right that the husband
has to appeal to the courts in her individual name for any unjust
usurpation of her natural or property rights," 27 did not authorize
her to maintain this action, as the statue merely intended to give to
the wife the same rights that the husband had at common law, and
the husband never had such a right.
In Texas the rule is the same, though there is evident a strong
inclination on the part of the courts to change it. The rule was estab-
lished in 1886 in the case of Nickerson v. Nickerson.2 The decision
in this case was reluctantly followed in 1908 in the case of Skyes v.
Speer,29 and in 1913 in the case of Wilson v. BroY30 The judge
says in the latter case, "The rule in Nickerson v. Nickerson seems
to be supported by the weight of authority, and, whatever may be our
views, we do not feel justified in declining to accept it as the estab-
lished law of this state."
Up to the present time I have been able to find but three cases
allowing recovery to the wife in the kind of actions we have been
discussing. The first two, a Connecticut case and an Oklahoma case,
4 Peters v. Peters, 42 Ia. 182 (1875).
25179 S. W. 628; L. R. A. 1916 B. 881.
"65 Wash. 496 (1911).
21 Rem, and Bal. Code, Sec. 5926
28 65 Texas 281.
20112 S. W. 422.
-" 154 S. W. 322.
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appeared in the early part of the year 1914, and the third, a New
Hampshire case, was decided in 1915.
In Connecticut, the statute provided that "neither husband nor
wife shall acquire, by force of the marriage, any right to or interest
in any property held by the other before, or acquired after, such
marriage," and the wife "shall have power to make contracts with
third persons, and to convey to them real and personal estate, as if
unmarried." 81 The court in Browu v. Brown, 2 decided that the pur-
pose of the statute was not merely to ameliorate the condition of the
wife as to property rights, but to abolish the conception of the merger
of legal identities, and to establish "a new foundation, namely, equality
of husband and wife in legal identity and capacity of owning prop-
erty." Under this ruling the plaintiff was allowed to recover against
her husband for an assault and false imprisonment.
The Oklahoma statute provided that, "for any injuries sustained
to her reputation, person, property, or any natural right, she shall
have the same right to appeal in her own name alone, to the courts of
law or equity for redress and protection, that her husband has in his
own name alone." 33 Another statute abolished the former rule that
statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly con-
strued.34 It was held, in the case of Fielder v. Fielder,85 that this
required a liberal construction, and that, under such a construction,
a wife should be allowed to recover for a gunshot wound inflicted by
her husband.
The New Hampshire case, Gilman v. Gilman5 3 decided that
under a statute which provided that "the wife may sue and be sued,
in all matters in law and equity, and upon any contract by her made,
or for any wrong by her done, as if she were unmarried," 37 a wife
might sue her husband for a tort, the only test being whether or not
the action would lie if the marital relation were disregarded.
I believe that, in the foregoing article, I have examined prac-
tically every case that has arisen under this topic in this country. It
is clear that, up until the year 1914, there was an unbroken line of
authority uniformly disallowing the actions by the wife that we have
31 Acts 1877, chap. 114.
2 88 Conn. 42; 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 185.
33 Rev. Laws 1910, sec. 3363.
4 Rev. Laws 1910, sec. 2948.
9542 Okla. 124; 52 L. RL A. (N. S.) 189.
3 L. R. A. 1916 B. 907.
37 Public Laws, Chap. 176, sec. 2.
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been discussing; not, however, without strong dissenting opinions in
several cases. Since that time, three courts have allowed the wife to
recover for personal injury inflicted by the husband. Just what
development the next few years will bring remains yet to be seen.
It is unsafe at all times to predict what the future development
of the law on a subject will be, but, if the dissenting opinions in some
of the cases, together with the actual decisions in others, are an indi-
cation of the sentiment of the courts, then I think it is safe to say
that there is a growing inclination to construe the statutes liberally,
and allow the wife to sue and recover damages from her husband for
a tort committed against her person during coverture.
G. L. S.
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